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Abstract
Virtualization supplies a straightforward approach to high availability through
iterative replications of virtual machine (VM) checkpoints that encapsulate
the protected services. Unfortunately, traditional VM replication solutions
suffer from deficiencies in either response latency or state recovery consis-
tency, which constrains the adoption of VM replication in production. In
this work, we redesign the typical consistency model and network architec-
ture for virtual machine replication. In doing this, we extend the function
of the secondary host to be the primary recipient of network requests so
that the state of the primary VM (PVM) is retained by the secondary host
in the form of network packets. Specifically, the secondary host is set for
network redirection and packets recording. Should the primary host fail,
the recorded packets are used to recreate the state on the secondary host.
We name the system reverse replication of virtual machines (rRVM). Exper-
iments demonstrate the simultaneous strong recovery consistency and low
response latency of our real-time disaster recovery system. To be specific,
we achieved 100% concistency without additional latency imposed.
Declaration
During the master study, I have two research works rRVM [1] and Cor-
Honeypot [2] published from UCC and IEEE Cloud respectively. In which,
rRVM [1] contribute to some chapters in this thesis.
Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank Prof. Shaoning Pang and Prof. Hossein
Sarrafzadeh for the mentoring as well as the meticulous text review, and
Denis for the in-depth knowledge transfer in networking. In particular, I
want to thank Mr. Ding Lu and Mr. Yuan Zhang for their participation
in peripheral utility development and bug shooting. They step forward in
prototype demonstration independently with their knowledge in rRVM op-
eration. Also, I want to present my gratitude to Mr. Lei Zhu and Mr. Xueyi
Shi for their aid in data collection.
1
Contents
1 Introduction 6
1.1 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Major Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Research Project Development 9
2.1 Research Background and Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.1 VM, VMM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.2 Hardware virtualization, hardware-assisted virtualiza-
tion, and paravirtualization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.3 Xen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.4 Domain 0, Domain U [3] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.5 PVM and SVM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.6 Unikernel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.7 Shadow page table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.8 Replication and migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.9 Stop and copy, pre-copy and post-copy . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Related Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.1 Process migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.2 Virtual machine migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.3 VM replication, original work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.4 Packets record & replay assisted VM replication . . . . 18
2.3.5 VM Replication on Unikernel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.6 Heuristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 Research Objectives and Challenges 23
3.1 Research Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1.1 Challenge of consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.1.2 Trade-offs between consistency and latency . . . . . . . 24
2
4 Proposed Approach and Implementation 26
4.1 Design overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2 Research Methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2.1 System bootstrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2.2 Normal execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.2.3 Failover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.3 Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3.1 Test environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3.2 Latency overhead on interactive data flow . . . . . . . 36
4.3.3 Throughput overhead on bulk data flow . . . . . . . . 37
4.3.4 Recovery consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.3.5 Recovery time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4 Alternative research methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.4.1 No programming approaches for network redirection . 40
4.4.2 Layer 3 network redirection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.4.3 Network behavior differences in PV (paravirtualiza-
tion) and HVM (Hardware VM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.4.4 The impact of non-determinisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4.5 Potential optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.5 Application and Impact of Research Results . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5 Conclusion and Future Works 44
6 Appendix 53
3
List of Figures
3.1 The failover semantics of different virtual machine replica-
tion mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1 The architecture of rRVM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2 System bootstrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3 Different configurations for downstream and upstream inten-
sive services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.4 Queue expiration operation of SSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.5 Throughput of bulk traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.6 Recovery consistency evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4
List of Tables
4.1 Decouple of network and service activity, where ‘P’ and ‘A’
represent passive and active status, respectively. . . . . . . . . 28
4.2 Summary of the activities of rRVM components in different
stages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3 Average latency and timeout number of rRVM, Remus and
primitive replication under different replication frequencies
and network setups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4 Recovery time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5
Chapter 1
Introduction
Modern organizations usually implement distributed servers [4] for better
computing power, higher throughput, and modular separation. However,
the evolved complexity is accompanied by the inherent fragility as a failure
of a single node can cause the whole system to break down. The situation
with distributed systems is such that the increased quantity of elements, the
imperfect quality of each component, and the prolonged period of run time
render a failure inevitable, which leads to the notion that services have to
treat failure as routine rather than exceptional [5].
High availability (HA) services are those that are able to recover from
failures automatically. Traditionally, HA services are achieved with a HA
cluster [6], which directs requests exclusively to healthy nodes. Despite its
merits (i.e., scalability [6] and module isolation), HA clusters are highly spe-
cialized to a particular hardware or software architecture because it has to
be implemented in an ad-hoc manner. For instance, a load balancer [7] de-
signed for the API layer can not be employed in the logic layer, master-slave
database replication is useless for a shared nothing cache system [8], and a
HA framework (clustering) developed on one operating system is hardly
adaptable to another OS.
Service availability becomes a critical issue when a data center expands
to a certain point where hardware failure becomes routine rather than an
exception [5]. To minimize the economic loss, systems running on top of un-
trustable hardware should be able to automatically recover when encoun-
tering an hardware failure [9].
In view of the researchers that utilize virtual machine replication for high
availability services, the merits of virtualization technology render its recent
highlight by both academy and industry. It shapes a new breed of server in-
frastructure, Cloud [10], [11], with its easiness and flexibility for large-scale
system management. Unlike physical machines, virtual machines are able
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to perform provisioning, scaling up/down and migration purely [12] on a
software level, which eliminates most of the rigid and complex hardware
tasks for those everyday system operations. Moreover, computing power
can be made more efficient with a finer granularity resource allocation, since
the capacity of real machines can be sub-divided and reallocated catering to
different workloads. The spectrum of virtualization technology expands to
several areas including cyber security. For example, virtual machine can be
used for honey pot with its capacity of fast provisioning of instances and
privilege isolation [13]. In this work, we are focusing on the utilizations of
virtualization in the area of high availability services.
1.1 Research Questions
Theoretically, a high availability service should be immune to hardware fail-
ures. One of the well adopted approaches to high availability is high avail-
ability cluster. In this solution, automatic disaster tolerance can be achieved
by redundantly deployed elements of the system. Examples are, reverse
proxy for Web server [14], [15], log replay mechanism and master-slave
architecture of database [16], distributed file system maintaining multiple
replicas [5], [17], [18] and software raid-1 like DRBD [19]. But systems of
this kind have to be implemented in a ad-hoc manner.
Virtualization [3] provides a generalized solution to HA services [20].
Through the replication of VM states from a primary host, a secondary VM
(SVM) is brought up to continue services whenever the primary host fails.
Here, the VM states include contents stored in CPU registers, memory, disk,
and other peripheral devices. Technically, a VM can encapsulate any kind of
software and hardware, thus a VM replication-based HA system can be im-
plemented once, then applied to a wide variety of architectures. Compared
to those ad hoc HA solutions whose components can be used exclusively
in the system where they are designed for, virtualization enables the repli-
cation of the whole state of a VM [20], which is a more generalized HA
solution. However, existing VM replication mechanisms are generally not
performant enough to be adopted in production.
This presented research focuses on virtual machine replication in back-
end, where virtual machine live migration is a key topic, since existing vir-
tual machine replication systems are mostly built on live migration prede-
cessor. Note that neither HA for front-end application (e.g., [21]), nor HA in
the form of task validity [22] is within the scope of this study.
This research proposes reverse replication of virtual machines (rRVM),
a novel virtual machine replication system. As the name implies, several
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properties of traditional systems are reversed in the proposed system: 1. In
rRVM, network positions of the primary and secondary hosts are reversed
compared to traditional solutions as clients requests are directed to the sec-
ondary host instead of the primary host; and 2. the secondary host can
recreate the primary VM’s state independently.
1.2 Major Contributions
The contributions of this research are as follows:
1. We solved the latency-consistency dilemma by decoupling network
and service activities. Moreover, we developed rRVM that removes the su-
perfluous blocking network buffer mentioned above and enables the pro-
tected system to execute with both strong recovery consistency and low re-
sponse latency.
2. We proposed the state lost as a new measurement for evaluating in-
consistency caused by failover. In performance evaluation, we summarized
the state lost of rRVM and existing solutions at different parameters to test
recovery consistency.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follow:
Chapter 2 gives the background of VM replication in which related works
are discussed.
Chapter 3 presents the problem statement and the motivation of the pro-
posed research.
Chapter 4 describes the overall design and detailed implementation of
the rRVM.
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis with an outlook on future work.
8
Chapter 2
Research Project Development
2.1 Research Background and Context
State consistency is crucial to VM replication. States are client’s data stored
on servers, which includes log-in authentication, committed financial trans-
actions, VoIP sessions, etc. In practical terminology, systems with strong
consistency always have all replicas as one state in the client’s view; whereas
for systems with weak consistency, writes which have been acknowledged to
clients might be lost after recovery. In practice, when a failure occurs, strong
consistency is more desirable because the protected system can be seamlessly
recovered to the state that existed immediately before the crash.
2.2 Definitions
2.2.1 VM, VMM
In cloud computing, VMM (Virtual Machine Monitor) or hypervisor is a
software that provides virtualized hardware environment, as well as man-
agement interfaces for virtual machine (VM) instances [11]. In another word,
the hypervisor is the operating system (OS) of VMs. Hypervisors are di-
vided into two categories: Type 1 that runs directly on hardware, and type
2 that runs on a host OS. Regardless of the type of hypervisor, a virtual ma-
chine is presented to a guest OS, where the VM is almost identical to a real
machine.
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2.2.2 Hardware virtualization, hardware-assisted virtualiza-
tion, and paravirtualization
Hardware virtualization refers to the technology that a hypervisor simu-
lates all hardware mechanisms in software. This type of hypervisor can
run an operating system unmodified. Qemu [23] [24] and BOCHS [25] are
two mostly adopted hypervisors in this category. The technology is initially
used for cross-compilation and cross-debugging, so the relatively weak per-
formance [25] imposed by software simulation is acceptable. However, the
performance becomes critical if virtualization is adopted on an industry
scale system such as cloud [10].
Hardware-assisted virtualization is introduced to make virtualization
more efficient. This requires support from processors such as Intel VT-x
and AMD-V.
Note that in practice, QEMU is usually teamed with KVM [26], a ker-
nel module that enables hardware-assisted virtualization, to compose the
hypervisor in a cloud system. Hardware virtualization, being hardware-
assisted or not, is referred to as full virtualization (FV).
Paravirtualization (PV) is introduced in Xen [3]. In contrast to FV, PV of-
floads some tasks (e.g., IO and network stack) in a guest to host OS, where
those operations are light weighted compared to HV. Thus PV achieves
nearly native performance, and it is especially useful in a system without
processor virtualization extensions (i.e., Intel VT-x or AMD-V). However, it
requires a modified guest operating system to address the alien virtualiza-
tion environment underneath [3].
2.2.3 Xen
Besides PV, Xen supports FV as well. Like KVM, Xen includes QEMU to
simulate the peripheral hardware and utilizes processor virtualization ex-
tensions to enable hardware-assisted virtualization. It is worth noting that
the majority of VM replication researches are conducted based on Xen [20]
[27] [28] [29].
2.2.4 Domain 0, Domain U [3]
In Xen’s terminology, the operating systems managed by the hypervisor are
called domains. Domain0 is a special domain that that has direct access to
the physical hardware. It is sometimes called as host operating system. One
of the purposes of Domain0 is to provide drivers for all the other domains
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running on virtual machines, called domainU. Thus, Domain0 is more priv-
ileged than domainUs in terms of protection rings. From administration’s
point of view, most of the tasks, e.g., creating and starting a virtual machine,
are conducted through Xen utilities installed on domain0.
2.2.5 PVM and SVM
Throughout this thesis, PVM and SVM are referred to as primary virtual
machine and secondary virtual machine respectively. Basically, the PVM is
the virtual machine that is being migrated or replicated. In some works, it
is also referred to as primary host, primary server or just primary. Inversely
SVM is the replicated version or mirror of PVM running on a remote ma-
chine. In the HA context, the standby SVM is used to replace the PVM after
a disaster event during which PVM is unavailable.
2.2.6 Unikernel
Unikernel [30] [31] is the future of Cloud computing. Adopting the LibOS
approach, operating system kernel can be highly tailed by linking the binary
of services to necessary operating system components (e.g., network stacks,
drivers). As a result, the service binary can run directly on hypervisor. By
reducing the additional layer of guest operating system, the system perfor-
mance can be enhanced tremendously and its resource consumption can be
made really low. VM replication based on unikernel is also ideal for long
distance replication because of its small memory footprint which requires
only minimal bandwidth for replication traffic.
2.2.7 Shadow page table
Basically, shadow page table is the Xen mechanism mapping the virtual
physical address that is presented to a guest OSes and the real physical
address. Shadow page table can be also used to track dirty pages in a hy-
pervisor, the information can be used for VM replication [12]. It functions
by introducing another page fault exception, and after the writing activity
is tracked, the exception will return the control to the original memory op-
eration routine. Another similar technique is called ghost buffer [32] being
used for cache hit rate estimation [33], for the ghost buffer records all the
cache hit actions as a middle layer.
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2.2.8 Replication and migration
In this thesis, both virtual machine migration and replication are referred to
the activities of transferring of the virtual machine state to a different phys-
ical machine or location. However, migration and replication have their
intrinsic differences. Firstly, migration is a one-off activity while replication
is usually long lasting process during which the migration action is being
performed recurrently. Secondly, migration is an operative activity on the
other hand replication is a fail-over resort preserving back-up(s) for the po-
tential disaster. Moreover, replication is usually a feature embedded within
a larger system which is executed automatically, while migration is man-
ually carried out by the operator or system administrators. In certain cir-
cumstances migration could also be an automatic process. One an example
is the use case of load balancing, in which VMM is responsible for moving
VMs from one physical machine to the another with lower workload after a
resource shortage is detected by VMM.
As in many other texts, synchronization and replication are used inter-
changeably in this article.
2.2.9 Stop and copy, pre-copy and post-copy
There are broadly three ways to migrate a virtual machine: stop and copy,
pre-copy and post-copy. The mechanism of stop and copy is well self-
explained, the PVM is stopped first, then the state of it is checkpointed and
transferred to the SVM and the SVM is raised. The obvious problem of this
kind of migration is that it doesn’t support continuous service so except for
the very early research on VM migration [34] this approach is not adopted.
In post-copy mechanism [35], only the essential portion of memory in the
VM is transferred first and then SVM is started. Other resources are copied
from PVM as required. The requirement of the resources from the original
machine is called residential dependency, which is the major reason why
post copy mechanism can’t be used for HA because if PVM fails during the
process, all the resources are lost although it supports continuous service be-
fore and after the copy. On the other hand, The mechanism of pre-copy sup-
ports both continuous service with resilience to disaster. In this approach,
all the memory state is transferred to SVM before it is started and PVM is
not needed by the SVM after the migration completes. Since most of virtual
machine synchronization systems are based on migration, the 3 types can
also be applied to synchronization technologies. For example, the goal of
Remus [20] built upon pre-copy mechanism is for HA while SnowFlock [35]
is implemented as a middleware for the purpose of cluster computing. The
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design and implementation detail of the two systems are discussed in the
following sections.
2.3 Related Research
2.3.1 Process migration
Process migration [36] [37] is the transfer of a sufficient amount of a process’
state from one node to another during when the process is executing. The
ability to migrate process offers many benefits, especially in a distributed
system. It does not only give more power to the system to control the work-
loads among the hosts but also optimizes the speed by reducing network
traffic. Besides, when the host on which a process runs failed, both the per-
sistent data and the complete process state should have been transferred to
the backup node so that the process can be started on another node, and
the clients will not notice any downtime, to keep the services available at all
time. [38]
There are four basic process migration algorithms exist in process mi-
gration. They are: Eager copy, Pre-copy, Lazy copy, and Flushing. Ea-
ger copy algorithm requires the entire state of the process has to be trans-
ferred before the process execution resumed on the destination node, e.g.,
MOSIX [39]. On the contract, lazy copy algorithm would only transfer as
minimal amount of data as possible to restart the process on the destination
node rather than all of them. The pre-copy algorithm is almost similar to
the eager copy algorithm. The difference is that pre-copy algorithm oper-
ates migration while the source process is still executing. When reaching a
certain point, the process on the source machine would be suspended and
all other states would be sent to the destination machine [40] [41]. Finally,
the flushing algorithm trades off the increased overhead of the state copy
soperation for the elimination of residual dependencies that exists in the
lazy copy algorithm. This algorithm is initially introduced in Sprite OS [42].
However, there are many issues that would happen during migration.
For instance, residual dependencies are some part of the process state that
left on the source host or sometimes on an intermediate host while migrat-
ing. They typically occur when implementing two techniques: either us-
ing Copy-On-Reference (e.g., Mach [43]), or as a mean for achieving trans-
parency in communication. Note that Copy-On-Reference is a technique
that copies the state whenever the state is read. Residual dependencies
will affect reliability because a migrated remote process will always depend
on its home node [44]. Shared memory is another problematic part [45].
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Most systems disallowed migration of processes using shared memory (e.g.,
Sprite [42]), while for others that supported both shared memory and mi-
gration chose not to provide transparent access to shared memory after mi-
gration (e.g. Locus [46]).
2.3.2 Virtual machine migration
Virtual machine migration usually is performed for the purpose of system
maintenance, e.g. hardware replacing, software upgrading or load balanc-
ing. Generally speaking, the migration of a virtual machine involves two
operations: 1. check pointing; 2. copying the checkpointed image to a re-
mote location. In this section, fundamental researches on live migration
based on three major kinds of hypervisors (Xen, ESX Serve and KVM) are
discussed.
Live migration on Xen
In [12], a live migration mechanism implemented based on Xen is presented.
It is the technical basis for some of the virtual machine synchronizing sys-
tems discussed in this text. A hybrid approach involving pre-copy and stop-
and-copy is adopted in this research. The migration of running, in service
systems, implies the needs for both minimized downtime and the consistent
server state including memory, network connection, and disk.
The inevitable suspension of the system is caused by the existence of the
so-called "writable working set (WWS)". Both of writable and working set
refers to the recently updated contents [47] [48] [49]. In this case, the mem-
ory region of WWS is characterized by its very high modifying frequency,
which utilizes previous pre-copy iterations so often that substantial over-
head is imposed. And the WWS is identified by utilizing the shadow page
table. Moreover, if the updating speed is even faster than a threshold the
possibly fastest transferring speed, the migration will not be able to com-
plete because of the newly dirtied pages. So stop-and-copy is triggered in
this scenario until WWS is fully transferred to SVM. The inconsistency be-
tween PVM and SVM is eliminated in this way.
The migration mechanism is divided broadly into two phases accord-
ingly: Firstly, all pages are copied in a pre-copy manner, and this phase is
called "pre-migration" [12]. In pre-migration, pages are copied by several
rounds. In each round, incremental checkpointing [50] is performed thus
only dirty pages newly updated after previous rounds are copied. Again,
dirty pages are identified by using Xen’s shadow page table (§2.2.7). Sec-
ondly, the active memory area or WWS is copied in "stop-and-copy" man-
14
ner [12]. By copying WWS only in this phase, the system downtime is
substantially shortened compared to that with pure stop-and-copy. Dur-
ing "stop-and-copy phase", the system is completely unavailable so how to
shorten the duration of this phase is one of the primary goals for later re-
searchers (§2.3.6).
To achieve the continuous service, the network connection should not
be reset during or after migration, and in order to be adaptive to various
of network environments, 3 different optimizations are applied. In an envi-
ronment that allows broadcast ARP (Address Resolution Protocol), an unso-
licited ARP is generated to inform peers in a local network the new location
of the system. In broadcast forbidden network, the system can either send
ARP requests to entries in current system’s ARP cache or passively waits
for switch finding the new location automatically. The unavoidable packets
lost is spontaneously dealt by upper protocols. These techniques for main-
taining the network connection are kept unchanged in the following virtual
machine synchronization systems like Remus [20] and Colo [27].
Unlike its VM synchronization derivatives, the burden of disk replica-
tion is on NAS (Network-attached storage) or alike specialized storage sys-
tems. This design decision imposes the most noticeable drawback in this
research since the mechanism is not compatible to quite a few data centers
without NAS facilities. In later research like Remus [20], this problem is
well solved by taking disk replication into account.
One of the biggest challenges in this research is to determine the value
of bandwidth limit for migration traffic: the high value of the limitation has
the impact on the running service while a low limit imposes a long time for
the WWS copy [20], which as afore-discussed is virtually the downtime of
the system during the migration. Although they failed to point out that in
real network topology, there is usually a dedicated LAN for migration traffic
and optimized bandwidth limitation is still required when the migration is
applied to WAN or a dedicated LAN is not available. In this research, a pre-
liminary optimization is proposed, in which the limit value is determined
by dirty page rate in previous rounds.
There are two implementation approaches for VM migration, i.e. self-
migration and managed migration. The difference between them is whether
the mechanism is implemented in domain U or domain 0. In real world
Only managed migration implemented in domain 0 is used because its sim-
plicity and less intrusion it imposes to the guest system.
To evaluate the performance of the live migration [12], the system is
tested with 3 kinds of servers with different requirements, i.e. a web server
with a heavy load; an SPECweb99 server requiring QoS and a Quake3 server
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which demands for real-time responses. In fact, the reasonable system per-
formance is one of the reasons that this research becomes the fundamental
of numerous coming ones.
Live migration on ESX Server
In [51], a similar live migration system called VMotion based on VMWare
ESX Server [52] is proposed. There are two differences between VMotion
and [12]: first, VMotion does not use shared storage, so it copies memory
state as well as storage content during the migration; secondly, it takes a
post-copy approach [51] so a residual dependency will exist temporary after
the secondary VM is brought up. The migration takes three steps also: 1.
Iteratively copy: all the memory is copied to the destination in rounds while
the primary VM is still running. This step is almost the same as the first step
of [12]. One thing to be noticed in this step is the dirty pages are tracked also
in the same way with the shadow page table used in [12], i.e. by marking
the pages read-only. 2. Converging: Suspend the primary virtual machine
and copy the “non-memory state” when the dirty memory is modifying too
fast that no progression is forwarded. This step is equivalent to “stop and
copy" 3. Resume the secondary VM and copy the remaining resources [53].
Live migration on KVM
The Live migration on KVM is similar to that on Xen and VMWare except for
that in KVM live migration, a consistent images directory is necessary [26].
To carry out the live migration, firstly a new virtual machine with -incoming
TCP parameter on destination host server is created. This new virtual ma-
chine attaches the source virtual machine image which locates in a shared
storage with dirty page logging enabled; Secondly, the PVM memory page
is locked and whole memory content is transferred to SVM. Moreover, a
temporary memory zone is enabled to keep PVM running. Thirdly new
temporary memory zone records incremental memory data and iteratively
transfer them to SVM, then these pages were written by the guest. Finally,
PVM is suspended and transfer the remaining data and resume the SVM on
the destination host. Throughout the process, virsh is used to carry out the
operations [26].
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2.3.3 VM replication, original work
In [20], a virtual machine replication system called Remus is proposed. Com-
pared to its migration predecessor [12], the new system [20] has 3 advan-
tages.
Firstly, the performance is optimized so that the sustainable iterative mi-
grations is feasible. Secondly, in addition to WWS outward network buffer-
ing is added for the maintenance of consistency. Last but most importantly,
the state of secondary storage is taken into account so expensive and spe-
cialized hardware like NAS is no longer compulsory. This improvement is
of great value since it largely enhances the generality of the system. The
details of these advantages are discussed below.
As aforementioned, the performance demand of Remus is higher than
that of live migration systems. This additional demand is imposed by the
reiterative and real-time manner in which the VM state is replicated. In [20],
the researchers find out that the latency is mostly incurred by the communi-
cation overhead required by domain U suspend/resume between migration
process, xend and xenstore, the two core components of Xen. So by creating
a direct channel through which migration process and domain U can com-
municate directly, the interprocess communication overhead is diminished
and the latency is reduced by two orders of magnitude.
The most outstanding optimization which by and large characterizes this
research is the asynchronizing of the VM state copying process. Basically
speaking, rather than stop-and-copy the WWS in the last round, the system
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keeps on running speculatively or asynchronously during the process. One
problem in asynchronized scenario is that the consistency is periodically
undermined by the speculative execution of PVM. To solve this problem, a
buffer layer is added at PVM. The buffer is used to hold all the outbound
packets generated by the speculative execution which in turn are released
to clients after a checkpoint acknowledgment is received from SVM. As a
result, despite the inconsistency of internal states of PVM and SVM, they
are consistent from the client point of view.
When it comes to secondary storage state the inconsistency between first
and secondary storage rises. This inconsistency is incurred by the fact that
disk state is copied as a stream in a continuous manner while checkpoints
of memory are transferred in epochs. To maintain the consistency, another
layer of the buffer is added at SVM, which holds all the disk modifications
received from PVM. Similar to network buffer, the disk buffer is released
when an epoch arrives and a real disk writing is performed afterward.
Although the system is well tuned for virtual machine synchronization,
there are two apparent drawbacks performance-wise. First, the network
cache holding all outbound traffic during speculative execution incurs no-
ticeable latency; Secondly, the considerable bandwidth occupied by the con-
tinuous copying of VM state is a noticeable overhead. And the high epoch
frequency in Remus exacerbates both of these two problems.
2.3.4 Packets record & replay assisted VM replication
COLO
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Based on Remus, COLO [27], or so-called coarse-grained lock-stepping is
proposed to reduce the epoch frequency. Apart from the lock stepping
approach discussed earlier, COLO [27] is a lock-stepping VM replication
mechanism on the network level. This work makes an assumption that con-
sistent virtual machines always generate identical network output for the
same network input. Based on the theory, COLO’s mechanism is as follow-
ing. Firstly, whenever an external network input arrives, PVM a)processes
the packet and buffer the output and b) relays it to SVM; Secondly on SVM,
same executable processes the packet and send its output to PVM instead
of external network; Thirdly, PVM compares the SVM’s response to that it
buffered in the previous step; Lastly, COLO will notice an inconsistency if
there is discrepancy in the two versions of output (from SVM and PVM) and
invoke a Remus [20] replication.
COLO is scalable in most real world environments, notably when the
protected VM interacts with a backends database that may or may not be
protected by the VM replication system. It avoids duplicated output from
SVM to the backend since SVM only talk to PVM and treats the database as
the external system as well.
However, COLO has numeric flaws. 1) Although TCP protocol is mod-
ified to generate deterministic packets, operations at the non-network level
are often non-deterministic. One example is the OS scheduling of multi-
thread application; 2) Despite one of the goals of COLO is to reduce latency,
it introduces new source of latency by waiting for response from SVM syn-
chronizedly. And the latency of the whole system will be increased linearly
increase linearly with the node number, and 3) consistent virtual machine
states are neither sufficient nor necessary condition to identical network out-
puts since network responses are largely determined by the implementation
of certain application. So the states of SVM could be long corrupted before
COLO can detect inconsistency. Thus, protected by COLO, it is very hard
for systems to survive in an instant failure.
LLM
LLM [54] is another work towards reducing the frequencies of resource con-
suming state replication. LLM compensates the deducted checkpoint repli-
cation with the replication of the network. In a failover event, LLM can
rebuild the missing VM state due to the low state replication frequency by
replaying those packets to the secondary VM. In the primary host, LLM
records network packets in kernel space and then copy them to a user space
program. After LLM completes the lost information during the copy pro-
cess, it buffers the packets. Then LLM replicates the packet’s buffer to sec-
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ondary host in rounds. The packets replication is conducted during the
interval of state replication to avoid network congestion.
However, the authors of this work failed to recognize that the Remus
network output buffer is the crucial component to maintaining strong con-
sistency by blocking the last gasp packets as well as the uncommitted VM
state. Reasoning the buffer imposes significant response latency in the low-
frequency replication setting of LLV, they simply discard the buffer. Con-
sequentially, without any supplement means, LLM is weakened inevitably
inconsistency level.
2.3.5 VM Replication on Unikernel
Tardigrade [55] is a virtual machine replication system using a Unikernel
guest, Drawbridge. The small footprint of VM guest gives Tardigrade an
obvious performance advantage over Remus even though Tardigrade bor-
rows Remus replication policies (e.g., it too adopts a network buffer to block
the last gasp packets). Besides the underlaying software stack, there are sev-
eral differences between Tardigrade and its Xen based VM live migration &
replicatoin counterpart. a) Tardigrade enables a multiple backups configu-
ration, another benefit offered by the small footprint of Unikernel; b) Tardi-
grade ueses record and replay of ABI (narrow binary inter- face) calls for
disk replication while Remus replicate the actual content and c) Tardigrade
enforces independent networks for business and replication traffic while Re-
mus supports both independent and shared network layout. Despite the
advantage of Unikernel, Tardigrade has some flaws compared to Remus.
Firstly, unlike Remus, Tardigrade can not maintain a persistent TCP con-
nection in failover events because of a problematic design in Bascule, that
is, applying the socket on host rather than guest so it is not visible by the
checkpointer; Secondly, some of the nondeterministic ABIs, that are used in
disk replication, imposes more complexities in the system implementation.
2.3.6 Heuristics
There are numerous drawbacks in the original work of VM live migration
and synchronization, and some of them are well fixed by the following re-
searches. Although the majority of the optimization is based on live mi-
gration, since live migration is the basic element of virtual machine sychro-
nization, the later can directly benefit from optimization based on it. For
example, the current version of real world Remus [20] adopts a similar way
described in [47] for disk synchronization and abandon its original design
20
discussed in the paper [20]. In this section, the major optimizations are dis-
cussed and categorized according to the policy despite the different mecha-
nisms they seemly adopt.
Performance
Some researches aim to shorten the suspending time or total migration time
by performance optimization. In [56], the time and space efficiency of check-
pointing is further enhanced by excluding the page cache in a snapshot. The
portion of memory could be safely omitted because the content already re-
sides in the secondary storage and a page-to-disk block map is maintained
to store the relation information of page cache and the associated disk loca-
tion (ADL) [33] [56].
Since the research of [56] is purely on checkpointing, it is not applicable
to live migration until [57], in which the technology introduced by [56] is
integrated to a shared storage, and because only the page-to-disk block map
is needed to be transferred rather than the real content of page cache, it
is reasonable to assume that the speed of migration could be dramatically
enhanced in comparison to full migration techniques even though the value
is not explicitly given by the paper.
[58]
Long distance (WAN) replication
When the synchronization is applied in a wide-area network (WAN) envi-
ronment, new challenges arise: 1. limited or heterogeneous bandwidth and
latency; 2. huge data volume involved in storage relocation because of a
lack of shared storage in the environment as ARP is a LAN based proto-
col; 3. service continuity on WAN is hard to maintain, since the IP of the
VM is supposed to change as the physical location and the unsolicited ARP
adopted by live migration is not applicable in WAN. As a result, most re-
searches in this area mainly solve these three problems.
XvMotion [59] is based on the core part of live migration of VMWare
ESX Serve, VMotionq [51] (§2.3.2). It uses I/O mirroring, that replicates
all I/O activities from primary to secondary, developed in [59] to solve the
storage relocation problem and introduces a few optimizations adjusting to
the unstable WAN.
One of the optimizations is a new transport protocol called stream trans-
port framework [59]. The protocol is different from TCP by opening mul-
tiple connections for avoiding HOL (head of line). While stream transport
framework can saturate the bandwidth better than TCP, the authors fail to
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evaluate the impact of the migration activity impose to other live services.
Other optimizations include how to scheduling among first-time disk trans-
ferring, memory state synchronization, and I/O mirroring. Moreover, Xv-
Motion throttle the VM after detection of a lacking of bandwidth in order
to reduce the number of dirty pages and eventually, the volume of data
being transferred. Congestion control mechanism is also introduced in the
research for the same purpose because standard TCP congestion control can
not be applied to the system.
However, in terms of service continuity on WAN, the work [59] just men-
tions some potential solutions without pointing out the solution it adopts.
One of those solutions is OpenFlow [60], which is the most intuitive solu-
tion if the purpose is to redirect network packets on WLAN. OpenFlow [60]
is adopted by [61] as well. Other solutions include IP mobility [62]; Over-
lay network [63] and dynamic DNS [64], all of which enable WAN packets
redirection.
in [65], a three-phase, fractional, hybrid migration solution for memory
and storage are proposed to achieve adaptive and responsive WAN-wide
VM migration. The complete migration consists three phases: pre-copy,
stop-and-copy, and post-copy, where M percent of memory and S percent
of storage are transferred within the first two phases. In the pre-copy phase,
the system started with storage transfer, when S storage is transferred, the
available bandwidth is then allocated to move M memory. When further
pre-copy iterations are not expected to improve the memory transfer (i.e.,
page dirtying rate is higher than transmission rate), the system enter the
stop-and-copy phase until M memory an S storage are fully migrated. At
the pos-copy phase, the remaining memory is migrated and then the stor-
age.
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Chapter 3
Research Objectives and
Challenges
3.1 Research Challenges
Remus [20] is the groundbreaking system of this kind. To perform the
expensive virtual machine replication consecutively, Remus adopts a few
heuristics such as an improved memory copying mechanism, a direct com-
munication the channel between the migration process and domU (i.e., guest
operating system), and speculative execution of the primary virtual ma-
chine. However, Remus has not solved the fundamental difficulties of VM
replication: high response latency and weak recovery consistency.
In general, solutions to these problems offer tradeoffs between the two
objectives. Remus enhances consistency by entailing a blocking network
buffer, but this incurs a high response latency as a side effect. Another main-
stream VM replication-based HA system, COLO [27] is tuned for a lower la-
tency, but consistency is compromised. Hence, the difficulties of high/low
latency and weak/strong consistency has never been satisfactorily solved.
3.1.1 Challenge of consistency
Typical VM replication systems only support weak consistency, in which
the pre-copy stage [12] [51] of the VM migration is performed in epochs.
An epoch comprises three consecutive operations: (a) executing the virtual
machine, (b) checkpointing the state, and (c) replicating the state to a re-
mote host. The duration of an epoch is configurable and normally has a
predefined value of hundreds of milliseconds. One problem with these sys-
tems is that when a failure occurs in an epoch, the secondary VM can only
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Figure 3.1: The failover semantics of different virtual machine replication
mechanisms
be brought up in an out-of-date state, which reflects the completion of the
previous epoch.
Figure 3.1-1 illustrates this states inconsistency described above. In a
normal epoch, a client sends requests to the primary VM and the packets
updates the VM states accordingly. Then the HA system replicates the pri-
mary VM states to a secondary host. In a failure epoch, the primary VM
state (S2) before the crash is lost because the failure of the primary host in-
terrupts the scheduled replication in the HA system. In a recovery epoch,
the HA system brings up a secondary VM to a state (S1) obtained through
the replication in a normal epoch, yet leaves the client view as the state
(S2) acknowledged by the packet (2) in the failure epoch. Consequently,
whenever the client sends the request packet (3) after the failover, a transac-
tion error occurs. This scenarios was described as the output commit problem
in [66]. We henceforth call the problematic acknowledgment of packet (2) in
the failure epoch as last gasp packets.
3.1.2 Trade-offs between consistency and latency
Remus adopts atomization to achieve strong consistency [67]. Figure 3.1-
2 depicts a UML sequence diagram of Remus, in which the network re-
sponse and VM state replication are manipulated as one atomic operation
by adding in a network buffer. The buffer blocks the output from the pro-
tected system until a replication is acknowledged by the secondary host.
The last gasp packets thus are discarded whenever VM state replication is in-
terrupted. Theoretically, this design should maintain a consistent client’s
view of the system state. This approach, however, has three significant
drawbacks. Firstly, the server state is rolled back after the failure, which
incurs packets retransmissions and additional recovery time. Secondly, it
does not achieve strong consistency for low-frequency replication (i.e., less
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than five times per second or 200 milliseconds epoch duration). In such
cases, there will be state lost after recovery because that the network buffer
is only active in part of an epoch, that is, from checkpointing start to migra-
tion acknowledgment. As a result, it does not block last gasp packets for the
rest of the epoch and does not guarantee state recovery consistency (§4.3.4).
Thirdly, the blocking network buffer imposes significant latency overhead
in protecting the failure-free system. This is the most important drawback
addressed in rRVM.
COLO [27] reduces response latency by the lock-step approach in which
two VMs are running in parallel. To determine if the states of the two VMs
are consistent, COLO compares their network output by leveraging the TCP
ordered data transfer. When an inconsistency is detected, COLO triggers a
Remus VM replication that overwrites the secondary VM state. This de-
sign minimizes the number of replications and latency overhead is reduced.
However, the identical output from the two VMs does not guarantee the
consistency of their states, which follows that inconsistency cannot always
be detected. In the event of a failure, the primary state might have been
lost on the secondary host because of the absence of the necessary replica-
tion. Therefore, the low latency of COLO is gained at the price of recovery
consistency.
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Chapter 4
Proposed Approach and
Implementation
In this work, we propose reverse replication of virtual machines (rRVM)
as an advanced solution for real-time disaster recovery. In contrast to the
atomization and lock-step approaches, rRVM has all completed network
interactions committed during normal execution and incomplete ones re-
played during recovery. Figure 3.1-3 shows the working flow of rRVM. The
distinguishing feature of our system is that, during failover, the secondary
VM is capable of updating its state independently, which enables the VM
to recover to a state 100% consistent to that existed immediately before the
crash.
We also introduce the concept of decoupling network and service ac-
tivity, which leads to three benefits. First, it supports strong consistency.
As the primary recipient of network traffic (a.k.a., network active), the sec-
ondary host can intercept and record network packets. During failover, the
logged packets are replayed to roll forward the state of the secondary VM
until consistent to that of the primary VM. Second, it imposes nearly no la-
tency overhead. In theory, rRVM is slower than primitive VM replication
since the redirection and interception of packets required by the decoupling
have a slight latency cost. However, the difference is barely measurable as
both operations are asynchronous (non-blocking). Third, the network ar-
chitecture supports flexible deployment of VMs. In rRVM, it is easy to run
multiple primary and secondary VM instances on the same host and allo-
cate hardware resources for VMs as required. The design of decoupling
network and service activity is discussed in detailed in the next section.
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Figure 4.1: The architecture of rRVM
4.1 Design overview
Figure 4.1 shows the architecture of rRVM. In our setting, we enlist two sep-
arated LANs. The primary LAN, composed of all hosts for physical network
interfaces eth0, deals with all external network traffics destined to the pro-
tected VMs. The redirection LAN, composed of eth1 interfaces of the hosts,
is dedicated to network redirection. For any given VMs protected by rRVM,
two hosts are involved in normal execution: the primary host runs the VM
executing the service binary and the secondary host receives and redirects
network packets.
rRVM uses a customized active-and-passive configuration as a failover
model. In this setting, the protected services run on the primary VM, while
the secondary VM is a dormant recipient, receiving system states from the
primary. When the system fails over, the secondary VM is brought up with
the state received. An active-and-passive configuration enlists only one
running instance that consumes resources, thus this configuration is usu-
ally more efficient than its active-and-active counterparts that have two in-
stances running in parallel. As mentioned before, COLO adopts the active-
and-active configuration. In our case, we renovate the typical active-and-
passive configuration by decoupling network and service activities. We
define a system as service active if it executes the application binary and
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network active if it is the principal recipient of business packets. Table 4.1
gives the results of our design, where the service and network are simulta-
neously active or passive for those hosts with a standard active-and-passive
configuration. In contrast, during the normal execution of rRVM, a host can
be either network or service active. As the result of the decoupling, during
normal execution, the primary host is service active (network inactive), and
the secondary host is network active (service inactive). It is worth noting
that a VM shares the same property regarding service activity as its host.
System type: Traditional systems rRVM
Status: Network Service Network Service
Primary A A P A
Secondary P P A P
Pre-initialized N/A N/A P P
Failed P P P P
Promoted N/A N/A A A
Table 4.1: Decouple of network and service activity, where ‘P’ and ‘A’ rep-
resent passive and active status, respectively.
In general, normal execution of rRVM consists of two major network
operations: packets redirection and interception. Considering that the pri-
mary VM is network inactive, and not accessible from the business LAN,
we redirect network traffic to the primary VM through the secondary host
and redirection LAN, as depicted in Figure 4.1). rRVM achieves this redi-
rection by (a) setting up a layer two network proxy on the secondary host,
which relays the packets from the host’s eth0 to eth1, and (b) creating an-
other proxy on the primary host that interconnects the host’s eth1 to the
virtual network interface of the protected VM. In this article, we also refer
to these two proxies as software switches SSA and SSB respectively. During
packets interception, the secondary host records the packets in a first-in-
first-out (FIFO) queue group to retain the newest system state in the form of
network packets.
In rRVM, network redirection is the primary cause of the extra latency
added to the overall round-trip time (RTT) between clients and the pro-
tected VM since the other network operation, that is, non-blocking packets
interception, incurs nearly zero latency [68]. The amount of latency added
here is equals to the LAN RTT between the primary and secondary hosts,
(i.e., less than one millisecond in standard data centers) [69] [70]. Despite
the minimal latency penalty, rRVM maintains close to 0% state lost during
failover according to our testing result.
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As depicted in Figure 4.1, rRVM checkpoints the VM states and copies
them from the primary to the secondary host periodically. The state di-
vergence occurs for every epoch when the primary VM resumes from the
checkpointing suspension. For state recovery consistency, rRVM reconciles
this divergence by replaying the recorded packets in the queue group to the
secondary VM during the failover.
Unlike the standard active-and-passive configuration, the failover mech-
anism of rRVM covers both primary and secondary hosts. The reason be-
hind this is that our network architecture incorporates the secondary host
into the critical path, and its failure causes the breakdown of the whole sys-
tem. Generally speaking, in the case of the failure of either host, we promote
the healthy one to be both service and network active (defined in Table 4.1).
The failover model of rRVM is discussed in detail in Section 4.2.3. In rRVM
speak, a failure of the primary host is called a service activity failure, and
a failure of the secondary host is referred to as a network activity failure
responsively.
We program all of the above components and operations in C as two
user space ELF executables, which gives the system a better compatibility
and flexibility. In the following sections, we discuss rRVM implementation
in three stages: system initialization, normal execution, and failover.
4.2 Research Methodologies
4.2.1 System bootstrap
Figure 4.2 introduces rRVM initialization. The first step is a live migration
that sets up the desired architecture given in Figure 4.1. In doing that, we
add a physical machine for the target VM being protected and live migrate
the VM towards it. The host stays as pre-initialized (defined in Table 4.1)
throughout the migration process. Next, we set the added host as the pri-
mary host and the pre-existing one as the secondary host. In this way, the
primary host is responsible for service and the secondary host is ready for
network redirection. It is worth noting that owing to the live migration, up-
dating the MAC table in a physical switch is not required. The reason is that
the secondary host remains network active even with the VM removed by
the migration. Because the physical switch in the LAN does not need to up-
date the physical location of the protected VM; hence, no additional latency
is caused here.
Other operations for system initialization include (a) stops the network
traffic destined to the primary VM from the business LAN, so that the traffic
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has to travel through the secondary host, (b) start software switches on the
primary and secondary hosts, and set all network interfaces involved to
promiscuous mode, and (c) initiate the replication and enter into a normal
execution stage (§4.2.2).
4.2.2 Normal execution
In this section we discuss the three major components of rRVM. All compo-
nents are initialized with the process discussed in the previous section, and
they remain functioning in the initial configuration until a failure of either
the primary or secondary host occurs.
Network redirection
When the system initializes, the primary VM is set as network passive. As
such, network packets are relayed to the primary VM through the secondary
host and the two software switches (as defined in §4.1). Three steps are
involved in this process.
• Step 1: SSA opens two packet sockets [71] listening to eth0 and eth1 on
the secondary host. This redirects the network traffic destined to the
protected VM from eth0 of the secondary host to the redirection LAN,
as depicted in Figure 4.1.
• Step 2: SSB on the primary host interconnects the backend virtual net-
work interface vif1.0 of the primary VM and the eth1 of the primary
host. This redirects packets received from Step 1 to the protected VM.
Note that when failover occurs, SSB activates the eth0 to promote the
primary host as network active, as described in Section §4.2.3.
• Step 3: SSB blocks the direct route to the primary VM by dropping
address resolution protocol (ARP) packets going to the primary VM
via the eth0. This ensures that future packets destined to the primary
VM go through the secondary host.
Note that SSA and SSB are full-duplex and all corresponding outbound traf-
fic is redirected in the same route back to clients. Further, network traffic for
collocated unprotected VMs is not affected by our software switches since
they operate only on the protected VM. This network redirection is transpar-
ent to the protected VM since neither software switches tampers the pack-
ets, except for the necessary low-level operations like TCP checksum and
segmentation as described above.
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Packets recording and replay
As mentioned in Section 4.1, SSA records all the network packets destined
to the protected VM in a group of FIFO queues on the secondary host. When
the primary host fails, SSA replays the recorded network packets to the pro-
tected VM and updates correspondingly the server state. At the normal
execution stage, the recording of packets works in a non-blocking mode,
thus no latency is involved. When failover occurs, the SSA is switches to
blocking mode, which stalls all newly incoming traffic. Only after the re-
play is finished does SSA release all blocked packets and becomes inactive.
As a result, network packets are ordered in a consistent sequence during the
failover. The detail of mode switch of SSA is discussed in Section 4.2.3.
The FIFO queues include those dynamically created for established TCP
connections and a static one shared by all UDP and other packets. The two
types of queues can be differentiated based on a dequeue operation, which
works as the first step of packets replay. We implement the first category
dequeue operation to simulate standard TCP interaction to maintain estab-
lished TCP connections, where a packet is dequeued only after the response
from the protected VM is received as the right SEQ and ACK numbers [72].
The second dequeue operation simply flushes UDP and other packets in one
batch and does not throttle packets replay because the packets here belong
to stateless connections.
In rRVM, the lost states of a failed VM acknowledged by last gasp packets
(§3.1.1) can be reproduced with the packets recorded in the queues on the
secondary host so that they cause no problem to service continuity. How-
ever, last gasp packets (§3.1.1) may cause a breakdown in the TCP connec-
tion when they are ACKs in a TCP 3-way handshake. Specifically, partially
established TCP connections can not be recreated even with the packets
replay, because the secondary host is not aware of the sequence number
agreed previously by the primary VM and client. In facing this problem,
we simply discard queues with only SYN packet, recognizing that partially
established connections are not essential server states. This design might
cause connection failure after recovery for servers based on short-session
connections. The impact in practice, however, is negligible in that long
session connections are more widely adopted (e.g., keep-alive headers of
HTTP [73]) normally for reducing the RTTs caused by hand shakes.
State replication and packets expiration
For state replication, same as with Remus, memory is checkpointed and
copied in an iterative manner through VM live migration [12] and disk state
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Figure 4.2: System bootstrap
Stages: Initialization Normal execution Network failover Service failover
Bootstrap
live migrates VM to
the new primary host
blocks instream to VM
sets NIC to promiscuous
starts SSA, SSB
starts VM replication
N/A N/A N/A
SSA (on secondary) N/A
bridges eth0, eth1
records instream
queue expiration
N/A
disconnects eth0, eth1
blocks new instream
bring up VM
replays queued packets
unblocks instream
SSB (on primary) N/A
bridges eth1, vif1.0
drops ARP to VM
records the latest ACK
bridge eth0 to vif1.0
sends an artificial
MAC masquerading
N/A
Table 4.2: Summary of the activities of rRVM components in different stages.
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Figure 4.3: Different configurations for downstream and upstream intensive
services
is replicated using I/O mirroring [19]. The replication traffic can be con-
figured to go selectively through the redirection LAN or the business LAN.
This ability makes rRVM adaptive to services with different traffic patterns.
As demonstrated in Figure 4.3, to avoid competition for bandwidth on phys-
ical network interfaces for both primary and secondary hosts, replication
traffic always goes in a direction opposite to bulk data flows with two dif-
ferent configurations. We set the default path of rRVM replication to the
business LAN through eth0s of both hosts because most cloud applications
are upstream-intensive. In the very few cases that services are both down-
stream and upstream intensive, competition for bandwidth is inevitable.
The performance impact on protected VM imposed by this competition is
examined in Section 4.3.3.
For packets expiration, packets seen by the primary VM and also re-
flected in the latest checkpoint are removed from queues to keep the mem-
ory consumption small. This operation is depicted in Figure 4.4. Firstly,
SSB records, in the primary host, the most recent acknowledge numbers ex-
tracted from response packets in every network connection. Secondly, the
recorded ACKs are transmitted to SSA in the secondary host along with the
replication traffic. Thirdly, when monitoring this traffic, SSA triggers ex-
piration of the queue entries with a less sequence number than the ACKs.
Note that all the packets in the queue group are in the order of the sequence
number. Thus, the packets expiration can be performed efficiently from the
tails. Also, the fine-grained expiration avoids packets duplication or lost
since all packets recorded in the queue are not reflected by the initial state
of the secondary VM when failover occurs.
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Figure 4.4: Queue expiration operation of SSA
4.2.3 Failover
In rRVM, a monitoring component is set to run on both primary and sec-
ondary hosts and to send heartbeats to each other. This component triggers
a failover if the heartbeat is absent from the other side, and promotes the
healthy host to be both service and network active. As discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1, the failover proceeds differently for the failure on the primary and
secondary hosts.
Primary failure
In the scenario of primary host failure, the secondary host is promoted to be
service active. This enlists changing the functions of SSB. At failover, SSB
stops redirecting network packets to the eth1 linked to the failed primary
host. Instead, it transmits all packets to the secondary VM. Other changes
that occur on failover include: First, incoming packets from the clients are
blocked. Second, packets in the queue group are replayed. As mentioned
in the previous section, the packets replay simulates real TCP interactions,
thus the established TCP connection is maintained. Finally, after packets
replay, SSB unblocks packets from the clients.
In the case of packets that can not be ordered (e.g., UDP packets), rRVM
works as a best-effort service and all packets in the queue are replayed in
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one batch. The protected system should cope with issues like lost, disor-
der, and duplication of packets caused by the replay in failover. Given that
the UDP packets are generally less essential than TCP packets, we believe
these issues, that exists in a very short period are acceptable by most of the
services being protected.
Secondary failure
The failover of the secondary host is to promotes the primary VM to be net-
work active. Several operations in SSA achieve this. First, it opens the eth0
port on the primary host and bridges the virtual network interface vif1.0 of
the VM to eth0. Second, to facilitate the MAC table update in the hardware
switch, SSA also sends an MAC masquerading packet with the address of
the protected VM. Since the VM is already service active and the system
state is up-to-date, no state update (e.g., network replay) is required here.
Packets that are not be transmitted by the SSB are simply treated as packets
lost by the protected VM.
We summarize the activities of SSA and SSB in the three stages in Table
4.2.
4.3 Outcomes
In this section, we evaluate the performance of rRVM by addressing vari-
ous benchmark criteria, which correspond to our two prime objectives, low
latency and strong consistency. In measuring rRVM performance impact,
we firstly evaluate its latency overhead on the interactive network traffic
by measuring the RTT between clients and an HTTP server. Then we mea-
sure the performance of a streaming server to test its impact on bulk data
transfer.
To measure rRVM effectiveness, we adopt two metrics, recovery consis-
tency and recovery time. Recovery consistency indicates how well an HA
system preserves server states after a disaster and recovery time counts the
time cost of a HA system for performing failover. To eliminate variance in-
curred by a WAN, we conduct all experiments with servers and clients in
the same LAN.
4.3.1 Test environment
Considering that computers used as a primary host usually have better per-
formance than those used as a secondary host, we do not use identical ma-
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chines for the two hosts. In our setting, a Dell R210 II server with a Xeon
3.30GHz CPU and 2048MB RAM is used as the primary host and an IBM
X3550 server with a Xeon 2.66GHz CPU and 1024MB RAM is used as the
secondary host. Both the servers have 250GB SATA disks and two 1GB net-
work interfaces connected to a business LAN and redirection LAN sepa-
rately. We use Cisco SG300-28 as the Ethernet switch. We use Ubuntu 12.04
with a kernel version of 3.2.0-23 as the operating system and Xen 4.1.4 as
the hypervisor for both hosts. We use Alpine Linux as the guest operating
system, which is set to take 512MB memory.
4.3.2 Latency overhead on interactive data flow
Replication Average latency(ms)
Timeout (>3000ms)
number
interval(ms): 50 100 300 50 100 300
Remus 59.20 68.52 77.48 28 30 28
Primitive 36.69 22.92 19.78 0 0 0
rRVM 35.55 25.01 20.37 0 0 0
Baseline 12.3 0QQQ
Table 4.3: Average latency and timeout number of rRVM, Remus and primi-
tive replication under different replication frequencies and network setups.
To test the latency impact of rRVM on interactive data flow, we use a
standard LAMP (Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP) hosted on the protected
system and press the server by running JMeter set on 30 concurrent threads
with each sending 2,000 requests per minute. We ignore the latency from the
system warming up, as in the long term this gives no performance overhead
on the system. For this measurement, we present the mean value calcu-
lated from the above experiment, and we record timeout number. Timeout
number is an important indicator for a HA system as it helps disclose the
occurrence and frequency of service unavailability.
We perform the latency test in four cases: (a) no replication, (b) primitive
VM replication, (c) Remus VM replication, and (d) rRVM. First we conduct
the test on the system without protection and mark the results as the base-
line. In each case involving VM replication, we perform the replication in
three different intervals: 50 ms, 100 ms, 300 ms. As shown in Table 4.3,
primitive replication and rRVM perform similarly, latency is less than 40
milliseconds, and no timeout is found for both cases. Remus gives an av-
erage latency of > 50 milliseconds and it has a number of timeouts, which
indicates a persisting unavailability of the protected system during normal
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execution. Given n threads each sending r requests, we calculate the avail-
ability of the protected system as:
A = 1− t¯/(r ∗ n)QQQQQQQQQQQQQQ(1)
where t¯ = Average timeout number,
r = Requests per thread,
n = Thread number.
In our experiment, Remus provides the availability of 1−28/(2000∗30) ≈
99.95% for protection of a failure-free system. One thing to note is that the
0.05 % unavailability caused by excessive latency overhead contradicts to
the purpose of HA systems.
We observe that low-frequency replication (e.g., 300 ms interval) allevi-
ates the latency cost of Remus. As explained in Section 3.1.2, the latency is
reduced at the expense of weakening recovery consistency, because the life
span of the blocking network buffer does not cover the entire epoch. We
will examine the state lost later in Section 4.3.4.
4.3.3 Throughput overhead on bulk data flow
Figure 4.5: Throughput of bulk traffic
In testing the rRVM impact on bulk data flow, we measure the through-
put of an upstream-intensive FTP server in protection where Siege [74] is
used, on a client machine, to send requests to the server that responds with
3MB of data for each transaction. Then we record the downloading time
to calculate the aggregate throughput. We conduct the experiment on 17
different replication frequencies in a range from 50 to 500 milliseconds and
calculate the mean value of throughput from 15 identical tests repeated for
each frequency. We omit downstream-intensive service in that it gives a
similar system performance, and services of this kind are relatively rare.
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Figure 4.5 compares the results from the three HA systems. As we ex-
pected, rRVM offers 10% less throughput than the primitive VM replication
for >200 milliseconds intervals due to the additional costs of network redi-
rection. Surprisingly, the throughput of primitive replication is worse than
rRVM for <200 milliseconds intervals. This can be explained by the fact
that in primitive replication, the replication traffic and the bulk data flow
compete for bandwidth on the eth0 of the primary host and the overhead
of such competition surpasses that of network redirection in rRVM (§4.2.2).
As compared to Remus, the superiority of rRVM is obvious and consistent
across all replication intervals.
4.3.4 Recovery consistency
Figure 4.6: Recovery consistency evaluation
When testing recovery consistency, we develop an Ajax front-end on
top of the LAMP model and set a client to send 5000 requests with a fre-
quency of 50 requests per second. The server stores the requests in both
memory and database to simulate a standard four-layer architecture (i.e.,
API, logic, cache, permanent storage) widely used in modern Cloud ap-
plications. Then, the state lost can be discovered by comparing the data
recorded by the server and the original sequence with which the client sent
out in the packets.
As shown in Figure 4.6, the recovery consistency of primitive VM repli-
cation degrades linearly with the replication frequency. For Remus, the
blocking network buffer protects the service from the output commit prob-
lem and alleviates such degradation. However, the state lost can be seen in
the case of low-frequency replication. We omit the data for rRVM in Figure
4.6 as all 5000 requests are fully retained after packets replay.
As explained in Section 3.1.2, the state lost in Remus is because the net-
work buffer protection can cover only a fixed part of an epoch. Thus, as
the replication frequency becomes low, the state lost is more observable. In
contrast, rRVM recovery consistency shows little correlation to the replica-
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tion frequency, thus it does not rely on high-frequency replication to enable
strong consistency. Note that low-frequency replication is more efficient in
both CPU and memory usage than high-frequency replication. Thus, the
peripheral performance impact of rRVM should be much less than that of
existing solutions in achieving the same level of recovery consistency.
4.3.5 Recovery time
Recovery type: Min Normal Max
Primitive VM Replication <1s 2-5s >30s
Remus <1s 2-5s >30s
rRVM network activity <1s 2-5s <5s
rRVM service activity 0s 1-2s <3s
Table 4.4: Recovery time
We use ICMP packets collected on a client for measuring the failover
time. With the same setup as the above experiments, we measure the time
cost from when a failure occurs and when the first response is received at
the client after the recovery of the protected VM. In the testing, occasionally
we observe more than 30 seconds recovery time for both primitive replica-
tion and Remus occasionally. This excessive recovery time is caused when
the physical switch can not detect the new location of the protected VM and
update its MAC table accordingly (§4.2.3) because there is no network out-
put from the newly recovered VM. Only after the MAC table aging time
is past, will the switch broadcast the new incoming packets to identify the
new physical port to which the VM connects. In the hardware switch we
use, the MAC table aging time is 30 seconds, which matches to our testing
result. It is worth noting here that this value varies in practice depending
on the configuration that is applied.
For network activity failover, SSA sends out an MAC masquerading
with the address of the protected VM to actively update the MAC table in
the hardware switch (§4.2.3). The worst case failover time here is 5 seconds.
For rRVM service activity failover, which does not require MAC table up-
dating, the worst case failover time is 3 seconds.
4.4 Alternative research methods
In this section, we discuss alternate design options and potential optimiza-
tions of rRVM.
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4.4.1 No programming approaches for network redirection
An option for network redirection is link aggregation, namely, BONDING
(5) and BRIDGE (8). In this method, virtual network interface vif1.0 and
physical interfaces eth0, eh1 are bridged together the on the secondary host,
which practically makse the secondary host works as a layer 2 switch. Dur-
ing normal execution, packets are redirected through eth0 and eth1; for ser-
vice activity failover, the redirection is switched to be in-between eth0 and
vif1.0. On the primary host, physical interfaces eth0 and eth1 are config-
ured in mode one network bonding (active-backup), and virtual network
interface vif1.0 is bridged to the logical bonded interface of the two slaves.
In this way, eth1 is set as the active interface for receiving packets during
normal execution and network activity failover is conducted by the mode
one bonding. This solution is simpler and more compatible than the in-use
approach as it requires only scripts for network configuration.
The drawback of this solution is the asymmetric configuration in which
a physical machine can be either a primary or secondary host for all VMs
on it, because network configuration is performed in a granularity of host
rather than VM. This incurs difficulty in system management. For exam-
ple, this solution is not suitable for certain tasks like chained failover that
enlists multiple backup points to avoid failures of multiple host. The larger
deployment granularity also causes resource waste as it is contradicts the
flexibility of modern cloud applications. In contrast, the symmetric config-
uration provided by rRVM supports flexible deployment so that a host can
be a primary or secondary host to different protected VMs at the same time.
Another approach to network redirection is port mirroring on the hard-
ware switch. In this method, the hardware switch broadcasts instream to
both primary and secondary hosts; the primary VM consumes the input and
executes the application binary of protected service; and the secondary host
just stores all the packets received. To avoid an output commit problem [66]
the primary host has to buffer the network output until the corresponding
input recording is acknowledged by the secondary host. So the latency im-
posed here is the same as the network redirection solution in use. The most
obvious drawback of this approach is that it results in an even more rigid
deployment policy than the asymmetric configuration, as the roles of the
physical machines (i.e., the primary and secondary hosts) are fixed by the
settings in the hardware switch. Moreover, hardware switch is not accessi-
ble in all environments.
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4.4.2 Layer 3 network redirection
In our initial design, network redirection is designed on layer 3. The in-
tuition behind this is Network Address Translation (NAT). First, when the
network proxy receives the broadcast ARP request destined to the protected
VM, it replies with the MAC address of its host (i.e., the secondary host).
Second, for inbound packets, the target IP addresses are translated to the
protected VM’s IP address of the redirection LAN. Third, for outbound
packets, the source IP addresses are altered back to the original IP of the
business LAN. We note that the layer 3 network redirection does not trig-
ger broadcast radiation, which could be caused by misconfigured layer 2
software switches.
The difficulty of layer 3 network redirection is ARP cache updating when
network activity failover occurs. During normal execution, an ARP re-
sponse from the network proxy updates the ARP cache in all peers belong-
ing to the business LAN, where the MAC associated with the protected VM
IP is set to be the MAC of secondary host. When network activity failover,
the MAC address needs to be converted back to the protected VM by an
unsolicited ARP. However, the router normally drops the ARP, seeing it as
spoofed. Thus, the router keeps an obsoleted ARP cache, and the protected
VM stays invisible in the business LAN after the failover. In contrary to
layer 3 network redirection, the layer 2 alternative keeps the destination
MAC address the same all the time, so no ARP cache update is required for
the proposed rRVM.
4.4.3 Network behavior differences in PV (paravirtualiza-
tion) and HVM (Hardware VM)
In a paravirtualization environment, the guest operating system offloads
TCP operations to the host operating system, as it does not include a full
network stack. However, the TCP stack of the host operating system is
bypassed by rRVM since it uses packet sockets. To make sure software
switches are working properly, we implement basic TCP operations, namely,
TCP checksum, segmentation and congestion control, in the user space.
Apart from that, further offloading the TCP operations to the network
interface card (NIC) [75] presents another approach to conducting the TCP
operations. For a HVM environment, the user space implementation of
the TCP stack is not required because packets are already processed by the
TCP stack of the guest operating system before being delivered to software
switches through the virtual network interface.
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4.4.4 The impact of non-determinisms
In practice, non-determinisms might corrupt the state consistency in two
ways: by non-deterministic system calls and by non-deterministic schedul-
ing. In this section, we discuss their implications in rRVM.
Some HA solutions enlist system calls in event replay [76]. However, in
the case of rRVM, the impact of non-deterministic system calls on the pro-
tected systems is negligible. This can be explained as 1) The time between
the last replication and crash is less than 1 second. The divergence that ap-
pears in such a short time window is small. 2) Most random states are not
critical for recovery. Examples here include timestamp for logging, random
numbers for load balancing,Ã§ nonce for playback defense, and padding
for block ciphers. For those random states that are essential for recovery,
such as the initial key used in credentials exchange, their impact also can
be also ignored since the handshakes seldom happen during the 1 second
failure epoch. To demonstrate this, consider the following extreme case. If
all random states are essential, which follows that every transaction relies
on previously generated random data, then transactions within the 1 sec-
ond failure epoch will all fail. In this case the success rate is calculated as
100(1/(10 ∗ 60)) = 99.98%, where availability is calculated commonly for
every 10 minutes (n.b., during normal execution, the availability is intact).
Considering all the above, we can safely omit non-deterministic system calls
in event replay and focus on network packets.
Non-deterministic scheduling, might also corrupt the state consistency.
In bug-free services, scheduling application-level threads are not allowed
to generate random essential service states or it is considered as dangerous
practice that should be avoided. Scheduling tasks (processes) amongst cores
causes CPU state inconsistency in the SMP architect, which should be exam-
ined carefully in an instruction level lockstep approach. Fortunately, this is
not a concern for high-level solutions like rRVM because a deviation of the
CPU state does not cause system panic in the VM replication approach.
4.4.5 Potential optimizations
One potential optimization of rRVM is tunneling. As discussed in Section
4.2.2, rRVM replication traffic competes with bulk data flow for bandwidth
in services that are both downstream and upstream-intensive. By tunneling
the network, business data flow can be redirected back through the business
LAN and the replication and business traffic can be completely isolated.
Another potential optimization of rRVM is a kernel mode software switch.
Kernel space applications are more efficient than user space applications as
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they do not include operations such as context switch and additional mem-
ory copying. Moreover, TCP checksum and segmentation (§4.2.2) can be
executed faster in kernel space because hardware offloading can be enabled
by simply setting ip_summed and nohdr in SKB. The drawback of kernel
space application is generality since the interfaces for kernel module pro-
gramming varies, even in the same operating system kernel of a different
release version. Moreover, it usually requires a rewrite of the whole system
to port a kernel module to another operating system.
4.5 Application and Impact of Research Results
rRVM demonstrates an enhanced HA system that offers an optimal combi-
nation of strong recovery consistency and low response latency. As com-
pared to the previous solutions, we decouple network and service activity
and propose a novel reverse replication approach. rRVM does not trade off
on performance: despite the apparent performance advantages, the follow-
ing virtues of virtual machine replication are fully preserved.
Transparency: rRVM is transparent to the protected system. Aiming
at a less intrusive solution, we design the network redirection in layer
2, we adopt a queue group to simulate TCP interaction for network
replay, and we implement all functionalities in domain 0 (i.e., the host
operating system).
Generality: rRVM is agnostic to the virtual machine monitor (VMM)
and the host operating system. In our implementation, 95% of rRVM
does not contain any platform-specific constructs. Owing to this, it can
be easily ported to any reasonably mature VMMs (e.g., KVM [26]).
Real-time failover: rRVM has a shorter and more stable failover time
than previous solutions. After failover occurs, rRVM sends out an
MAC masquerading packet containing the address of the protected
system, which practically reduces the time for MAC table updating in
an physical switch.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Works
In summary, we believe the improvements in rRVM design can lift the lim-
itations of VM replication and HA systems in general. With the new ar-
chitecture invented, rRVM exceeds the capabilities of all known VM repli-
cation systems; With the existing virtualization infrastructure untouched,
rRVM and can work in existing cloud environments out of the box. The
technology is particularly useful for task critical backend systems that de-
mand high frequent requests and high availability guarantee, for example,
the backend of securities trading, bank or medical systems. In those sys-
tems, 0.001% enhancement of the availability can create enormous value for
a corporation.
Moreover, the design of decoupling network and service has more prac-
tical implication beyond the virtual machine replication, although the pro-
posed reverse replication approach is implemented only on virtual machines
for HA service. For instances, the HA components of databases, distributed
file systems, or cache systems etc., in which master/slave configuration is
widely used, can be upgraded with this design to gain a better latency and
consistency metrics. For instance, in a database, database query requests can
be sent to, and be queued in the secondary host, and in turn be relayed to
the primary host. The replay queue in secondary stores transactions of SQL
in this case instead of raw ethernet packets (as in rRVM). And the failover
and replay mechanisms can be made the same.
There is great potential to improve rRVM itself as well. Firstly, besides
the innovation on the architecture design, we can put more efforts on sys-
tem engineering. One of the potential approaches is to implement the rRVM
in kernel mode to further reduce the overhead of memory copying, context
switching etc. Secondly, we can use Unikernel instead of ordinary virtual
machine guests to further reduce the overhead imposed by the high avail-
ability system. Incorporating with LibOS (a.k.a., Unikernel) [30], the perfor-
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mance of rRVM, that is, latency and bandwidth consumption can be largely
enhanced. This performance improvement can further lead to wider use
cases of this technology. For example, rRVM can be extended to an inter-
datacenter disaster recovery solution. Here, the LibOS’s small footprint can
solve the bandwidth bottleneck in a WAN environment. Also, rRVM natu-
rally supports low-frequency VM replication which recovers a VM from a
checkpoint replicated seconds ago, thus the WAN latency is not an obstacle
for inter-datacenter recovery. This will be left as a significant future work.
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Chapter 6
Appendix
This appendix contains some of the scripts used to establish the running
environment of rRVM as well as the day-to-day operation.
#!/ bin/bash
# i n s t a l l dependency
echo −e " Begin i n s t a l l i n g Xen dependency . . . \ n"
apt−get update
apt−get i n s t a l l l r z s z expect g i t−core bridge−u t i l s
l i b j p e g−turbo8−dev l ibvncserver−dev iproute l i b c u r l 3
l i b c u r l 4−openssl−dev bzip2 module−i n i t−t o o l s t r a n s f i g
t g i f t e x i n f o p c i u t i l s−dev build−e s s e n t i a l make gcc
l i b c 6−dev zl ib1g−dev python python−dev python−twis ted
l ibncurses5−dev patch l ibvncserver−dev i a s l l ibbz2−dev
e 2 f s l i b s−dev uuid−dev l i b t e x t−template−p e r l autoconf
debhelper debconf−u t i l s docbook−xml docbook−x s l dpatch
x s l t p r o c rcconf bison f l e x gcc−m u l t i l i b ocaml−f i n d l i b
l i b y a j l −dev y a j l−t o o l s l i b g l i b 2 .0−dev l i b s d l−t t f 2 .0−0
l i b s d l−t t f 2 .0−dev t e x l i v e−l a t e x−recommended t e x l i v e
t e x l i v e−base te tex−brev bin86 bcc −y
# get packages from 2 . 7 3
# f i r s t confirm g i t get l a t e s e t rRVM on 2 . 7 3
echo −e " Begin get packages ( Xen , rRVM, a lp ine . iso ,
config , e t c . ) \ n"
./ scp . exp 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 7 3 root cp−x2520
/root/create_alpine_vm/create_alpine_vm . tgz /root
pul l 0 −1
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cd /root
t a r −xvf create_alpine_vm . tgz
t a r −xvf xen −4 . 1 . 4 . t a r . gz
t a r −xvf rRVM. tgz
# compile xen
echo −e " Begin compiling Xen . . . \ n"
cd /root/xen−4.1.4/
make world − j 8 && make i n s t a l l −t o o l s
PYTHON_PREFIX_ARG= && make i n s t a l l
echo −e " Set Xen auto−s t a r t when booting . . . \ n"
update−rc . d xencommons d e f a u l t s 19 18
update−rc . d xend d e f a u l t s 20 21
update−rc . d xendomains d e f a u l t s 21 20
update−rc . d xen−watchdog d e f a u l t s 22 23
mv ./ d i s t / i n s t a l l /usr/ l i b 6 4 /* ./ d i s t / i n s t a l l /usr/ l i b /
mv ./ d i s t / i n s t a l l /usr/ l i b 6 4 /xen/bin /*
./ d i s t / i n s t a l l /usr/ l i b /xen/bin/
cd ./ d i s t
./ i n s t a l l . sh
echo −e "Copy Xen conf ig f i l e f o r xend−r e l o c a t i o n . . . \ n"
cd /root
cp xend−conf ig . sxp_template / e t c /xen/xend−conf ig . sxp
# check echo
#grep ’^( xend−r e l o c a t i o n ’ / e t c /xen/xend−conf ig . sxp
c a t << EOF > / e t c /ld . so . conf . d/ l i b c . conf
# l i b c d e f a u l t c o n f i g u r a t i o n
/usr/ l o c a l / l i b
l d c o n f i g
EOF
ln −s /usr/ l i b /xen /usr/ l i b /xen−d e f a u l t
# generate grub . c fg
echo −e " Generate grub menu f o r Xen . . . \ n"
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cd /root
update−grub
./ generate_grub . sh
# c r e a t e a lp ine . img f o r xen−remus t e s t i n g
#echo −e " Create a lp ine . img f o r xen−remus . . . \ n"
#mkdir −p /var/ l i b /xen/images
#dd i f =/dev/zero of=/var/ l i b /xen/images/xen_alpine . img
bs=1M count =3000
# copy inter face_normal template , need to be modified
manually
echo −e "Copy Xen inter face_normal template . . . \ n"
cp / e t c /network/ i n t e r f a c e s / e t c /network/ i n t e r f a c e s _ b a k
cp /root/ in ter faces_normal / e t c /network/ i n t e r f a c e s
# need r e s t a r t
# reboot
#!/ usr/bin/expect −−
proc Usage_Exit { myself } {
puts " "
puts "### USAGE: $myself ip user passwd s o u r c e f i l e
d e s t d i r d i r e c t i o n bwlimit timeout "
puts " "
puts " s o u r c e f i l e : a f i l e or d i r e c t o r y
to be t r a n s f e r r e d "
puts " d e s t d i r : the l o c a t i o n t h a t the
s o u r c e f i l e to be put i n t o "
puts " d i r e c t i o n : pul l or push . "
puts " pul l : remote −> l o c a l "
puts " push : l o c a l −> remote "
puts " bwlimit : bandwidth l i m i t , k b i t /s ,
0 means no l i m i t "
puts " timeout : timeout of expect , s ,
−1 means no timeout "
puts " "
e x i t 1
}
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i f { [ l l e n g t h $argv ] < 8 } {
Usage_Exit $argv0
}
s e t ip [ l index $argv 0]
s e t user [ l index $argv 1]
s e t passwd [ l index $argv 2]
s e t s o u r c e f i l e [ l index $argv 3]
s e t d e s t d i r [ l index $argv 4]
s e t d i r e c t i o n [ l index $argv 5]
s e t bwlimit [ l index $argv 6]
s e t t imeout f lag [ l index $argv 7]
s e t yesnof lag 0
s e t timeout $t imeout f lag
f o r { } { 1 } { } {
# f o r i s only used to r e t r y when " In terrupted system
c a l l " occured
# scp : −p T e l l s scp to preserve f i l e a t t r i b u t e s and
timestamps
# scp : −r Copy d i r e c t o r i e s r e c u r s i v e l y . Does not
fol low symbolic l i n k s
# rsync : −a , −−archive , archive mode , equiva lent to
−rlptgoD
# rsync : −r , −−recurs ive , recurse i n t o d i r e c t o r i e s
# rsync : −t , −−times , preserve times
# rsync : −z , −−compress , compress f i l e data
# rsync : −−progress show progress during t r a n s f e r
i f { $ d i r e c t i o n == " pul l " } {
i f { $bwlimit > 0 } {
spawn /usr/bin/rsync −a r t z −−bwlimit=$bwlimit
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−e "/ usr/bin/ssh −l $ u s e r "
$ip : $ s o u r c e f i l e $ d e s t d i r
} e l s e i f { $bwlimit == 0 } {
spawn /usr/bin/scp −r −p $user@$ip : $ s o u r c e f i l e
$ d e s t d i r
} e l s e {
Usage_Exit $argv0
}
} e l s e i f { $ d i r e c t i o n == " push " } {
i f { $bwlimit > 0 } {
spawn /usr/bin/rsync −a r t z −−bwlimit=$bwlimit
−e "/ usr/bin/ssh −l $ u s e r "
$ s o u r c e f i l e $ip : $ d e s t d i r
} e l s e i f { $bwlimit == 0 } {
spawn /usr/bin/scp −r −p $ s o u r c e f i l e $user@$ip : $ d e s t d i r
} e l s e {
Usage_Exit $argv0
}
} e l s e {
Usage_Exit $argv0
}
expect {
" assword : " {
send " $passwd\r "
break ;
}
" yes/no ) ? " {
s e t yesnof lag 1
send " yes\r "
break ;
}
"FATAL" {
puts "\nCONNECTERROR: $ip occur FATAL
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ERROR! ! ! \ n"
e x i t 1
}
timeout {
puts "\nCONNECTERROR: $ip logon TIMEOUT ! ! ! \ n"
e x i t 1
}
"No route to host " {
puts "\nCONNECTERROR: $ip No route to
host ! ! ! \ n"
e x i t 1
}
" Connection Refused " {
puts "\nCONNECTERROR: $ip Connection
Refused ! ! ! \ n"
e x i t 1
}
" Connection refused " {
puts "\nCONNECTERROR: $ip Connection
Refused ! ! ! \ n"
e x i t 1
}
" Host key v e r i f i c a t i o n f a i l e d " {
puts "\nCONNECTERROR: $ip Host key
v e r i f i c a t i o n f a i l e d ! ! ! \ n"
e x i t 1
}
" I l l e g a l host key " {
puts "\nCONNECTERROR: $ip I l l e g a l host
key ! ! ! \ n"
e x i t 1
}
" Connection Timed Out " {
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puts "\nCONNECTERROR: $ip logon
TIMEOUT ! ! ! \ n"
e x i t 1
}
" In ter rupted system c a l l " {
puts "\ n$ip Interrupted system c a l l ! ! ! \ n"
}
}
}
i f { $yesnof lag == 1 } {
expect {
" assword : " {
send " $passwd\r "
}
" yes/no ) ? " {
s e t yesnof lag 2
send " yes\r "
}
}
}
i f { $yesnof lag == 2 } {
expect {
" assword : " {
send " $passwd\r "
}
}
}
expect {
" assword : " {
send " $passwd\r "
puts "\nPASSWORDERROR: $ip PASSWORD
ERROR! ! ! \ n"
e x i t 1
}
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eof {
puts "ABS_OK_SCP : $ip\n"
e x i t 0 ;
}
}
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